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ith inflation in the eurozone stubbornly remaining on a downward trajectory, 
pressure on the European Central Bank (ECB) to do “something” to prevent outright 
deflation is growing. This “something” is usually understood to be massive asset 
purchases, or quantitative easing (QE). But would QE actually do the trick? 
The discussion has so far followed easily predictable national patterns: Creditor countries do 
not object to deflation, because it increases the real value of their investment, whereas debtor 
countries’ repayment burdens would grow heavier. 
In a closed economy, to every credit there must a corresponding debt. But consider individual 
countries: some run a large foreign debt, while others maintain a large creditor position. 
The United States and Germany are at opposite extremes of the creditor-debtor scale. The US, 
benefiting from the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of issuing debt denominated in its own currency, has 
run current-account deficits for more than 30 years. The total foreign debt of US residents (most 
of which is in US dollars) is above $7 trillion. This implies that any reduction in US interest 
rates would benefit the country as a whole, relative to creditor countries, like Germany, where 
interest income would fall. 
Within the eurozone, where until recently external accounts were nearly balanced, a similar 
creditor/debtor spectrum has emerged, with Germany and the Netherlands at one end, and much 
of the southern eurozone countries at the other. This partly explains both the hostile stance 
towards QE adopted in the German financial press and the over-indebted periphery countries’ 
increasingly desperate calls for more action by the ECB. 
In the eurozone, however, QE is a questionable response to such calls. QE is a special 
instrument used when a central bank’s short- and medium-term policy rates are already at zero 
and it wants to lower long-term interest rates. This implies that QE can be effective only in 
economies in which changes in long-term (market) interest rates play an important role in the 
private sector. 
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But this is not the case in Europe, where most investment is financed via bank loans that 
typically do not have long-term maturities – often less than five years – because banks 
themselves have little secure long-term financing. Moreover, the interest rates charged on these 
loans are not linked to market rates, but rather to the bank’s refinancing cost, which is already 
close to zero. 
In the eurozone, lower long-term rates for government bonds are thus unlikely to improve the 
corporate sector’s financing conditions and boost investment demand. By contrast, in the US, 
a much larger proportion of investment is financed by issuing bonds, which can have a longer 
maturity than bank loans. Moreover, these bonds are priced as spreads on the government-bond 
yield curve, implying that QE will have an immediate impact on enterprises’ financing costs. 
For households, the main impact of lower interest rates is felt through mortgages. But most of 
southern Europe relies mainly on floating rates. This implies that QE would not reach, say, 
Spanish households, whose mortgages are indexed to short-term rates, which are already close 
to zero. 
In the US, households have a prepayment option on their mortgages should interest rates fall. 
Moreover, mortgages are usually securitised. This implies that a fall in the rate at which bundles 
of mortgages can be sold on the market can have a strong impact on household spending, 
because lower long-term rates typically lead to waves of mortgage refinancing, leaving 
households with lower monthly payments – and thus higher disposable income. 
When the central bank buys large amounts of bonds, all asset prices, including housing, tend to 
increase. Here, too, the US, where higher house prices stimulate consumption, is a misleading 
example for Europe. Owner-occupancy rates are high in the US, and the financial system allows 
households to extract the equity in their homes relatively cheaply, either by second liens or by 
refinancing the entire mortgage. 
This is not possible in most of Europe, and especially not in Germany, where loan-to-value 
limits remain conservative, refinancing is costly, and most banks would frown on any attempt 
to cash in on ‘home equity’ to finance a vacation or a new car. Moreover, higher house prices 
and rents distribute income from poorer households (which typically rent) to richer households 
(which own the houses). But the poor have a much higher propensity to spend than the rich. A 
housing boom in a nation of renters might actually lead to lower aggregate consumption. 
Differences in financial structure thus matter profoundly in the effort to prevent deflation. 
Although QE might work in a debtor economy with a flexible financial system like the US, it 
could backfire in a creditor economy with a conservative financial system. This, rather than the 
fear that the ECB might end up buying the bonds of untrustworthy governments, is the real 
argument against QE in the eurozone. 
 
 
 
